En synnerligen intressant artikel i The WarZone om varför Ukrainas offensiv går så långsamt (jag ska inte använda andra värdeord än så):
A Sobering Analysis Of Ukraine’s Counteroffensive From The Front
The WarZone skrev:A military analyst just returned from touring the Ukraine front and has offered his blunt take on how the counteroffensive is really going.
utformad som en intervju med den österikisk-amerikanske forskaren
Franz-Stefan Gady vid IISS. Han beökte ukrainska frontlinjer tillsammans med ett gäng andra välrenommerade militärforskare:
The WarZone skrev:Gady visited Ukraine with a group including Konrad Muzyka, an independent defense analyst focusing on Russia and Belarus and director of Rochan Consulting; Rob Lee, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and Michael Kofman, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment and Principal Research Scientist, CNA.
Gady redovisar sina åsikter i 16 punkter och det skulle föra för långt att citera dem alla, men huvudpunkterna är desamma som jag skrev om här:
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Det är inte tillgången på vapensystem som är det stora problemet utan taktiska och operationella brister på slagfältet. Ukrainas armé klarar inte av att genomföra koordinerade operationer på det sätt som skulle krävas för bättre framsteg
The WarZone skrev:Ukrainian forces have still not mastered combined arms operations at scale. Operations are more sequential than synchronized. This creates various problems for the offense and IMO [in my opinion] is the main cause for slow progress.
An additional influx of weapons systems (e.g., ATACMs, air defense systems, MBTs, IFVs etc.) while important to sustain the war effort, will likely not have a decisive tactical impact without adaptation and more effective integration.
Ukraine will have to better synchronize and adapt current tactics, without which western equipment will not prove tactically decisive in the long run. This is happening but it is slow work in progress. (Most NATO-style militaries would struggle with this even more than the Ukrainians IMO).
Att enbart ta upp brister på krigsmateriel är vad Gady kallar "monoclausal. En sak som påpekas är dock bristen på minröjningssystem, även om sådana inte är något undermedel om de inte används taktiskt riktigt:
The WarZone skrev:Minefields are a problem as most observers know. They confine maneuver space and slow advances. But much more impactful than the minefields per se on Ukraine’s ability to break through Russian defenses is Ukraine's inability to conduct complex combined arms operations at scale. Lack of a comprehensive combined arms approach at scale makes Ukrainian forces more vulnerable to Russian ATGMs, artillery etc. while advancing. So it's not just about equipment. There’s simply no systematic pulling apart of the Russian defensive system that I could observe.
Jag skrev om minröjning tidigare här:
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The WarZone skrev:
An additional influx of weapons systems (e.g., ATACMs, air defense systems, MBTs, IFVs etc.) while important to sustain the war effort, will likely not have a decisive tactical impact without adaptation and more effective integration.
Ukraine will have to better synchronize and adapt current tactics, without which western equipment will not prove tactically decisive in the long run. This is happening but it is slow work in progress. (Most NATO-style militaries would struggle with this even more than the Ukrainians IMO).
Slutklämmen lyder
The WarZone skrev:It goes without saying that in a war of attrition, more artillery ammunition and hardware is always needed and needs to be steadily supplied. Western support of Ukraine certainly should continue as there is still the prospect that the counteroffensive will make gains. But soldiers fighting on the frontline we spoke to are all too aware that lack of progress is often more due to force employment, poor tactics, lack of coordination between units, bureaucratic red tape/infighting, Soviet style thinking etc. ... and Russians putting up stiff resistance.
Som jag har skrivit här tidigare så är detta under alla förhållanden en formidabel uppgift och någonting som egentligen aldrig gjorts, åtminstone inte efter 1918, och som egentligen bara USA:s krigsmakt har utrustning och kunskap för att genomföra. Gady sammanfattar det såhär;
The WarZone skrev:Gady however was quick to emphasize that “no Western type of military can really do this sort of combined arms operations at scale, with the exception of the United States. But even the United States Armed Forces would have a very difficult time breaking through these defensive layers because no Western military in the world currently has any experience in breaching the types of defenses in depth that the Russians put up, in the south and east of Ukraine.”
artillery officer and an advisor to General Zaluzhnyi
kan man räkna antalet detonationer av klustersprängladdningar med sådan precision att man kan yttra sig om detta? Men på asociala medier är allt möjlig!
Gepards for Ukraine.
