dr Cassandra Nojdh skrev: ↑torsdag 08 februari 2024 10:20
The WarZone beskriver hur ryssarna visat upp vrakresterna av en ny typ av ukrainsk UAV som företer vissa likheter med Shahed-238:
Russia may be trying to build 10,000 attack drones a year for use in Ukraine
Defense One skrev:Iran initially wanted to charge Moscow a licensing and component fee of $375,000 to assemble each Shahed-136 in Russia, which negotiated that down to $193,000 apiece for 6,000 drones, according to the “November 2022” document.
[...]
The 107 is presumably the Shahed-107 drone, while the 236 is likely in the same product family as the jet-powered Shahed-238.
The prices for the 236 seeker variant is given as $900,000, $1.4 million for the 236 turbo-jet, and $460,000 for the 107 drone, according to the document. The price of the 236 turbo-jet makes it more expensive than the estimated cost of Russia’s Kalibr cruise missile.
De iranska drönarna verkar inte vara så billiga som många experter hade trott. Dessutom har väl Iran fullt upp i Mellanöstern. Hoppas att Ukraina är effektivare!
How cheap drones are transforming warfare in Ukraine
The Economist skrev:One question is whether drones will be able to stay cheap as armies become more accustomed to defending against them. Forthcoming research by Jack Watling and his colleagues at the Royal United Services Institute, a think-tank in London, which draws on Ukrainian military data, suggests they may not. An FPV drone that has a good chance of getting through and achieving a kill against an armoured vehicle, they argue, requires fancy features such as infrared sensors for night missions, a high-quality radio which is resistant to interference from nearby drones, a biggish antenna and enough thrust to carry 5kg of high explosive.
Mr Watling and his colleagues estimate a price of about $30,000—two orders of magnitude higher than the cheap and cheerful munitions in use today. Many Ukrainian drone builders and operators vehemently contest these assumptions, arguing that much cheaper drones will remain effective, and that—as the garage-built drones have already proved—standard military procurement is bloated and inefficient.
One capability that drone pilots are keen on is autonomous object recognition, which would allow a drone cut off by jamming to complete the last phase of its attack autonomously. Object recognition is already available on expensive drones, like America’s Switchblade 300, which costs $53,000. Russia’s Ovod (Gadfly) FPV has supposedly used a similar AI-based “terminal guidance” system since last summer. But drone advocates argue that this too can be done on the cheap. The Ukrainian Scalpel drone, for instance, costs $1,000 and can lock onto a target designated by its pilot. So does the AirUnit, a prototype drone whose final version aims to be cheaper still. A recent FPV video claims to show two Russian Pantsir air-defence systems being destroyed using autonomous guidance.
Dessa FPV-drönare består huvudsakligen av kinesiska komponenter som har importerats och monterats för hand. Kan väst tillverka egna billiga drönare?
Ukraine launches mass production of Lancet drone analog
Militarnyi skrev:Mykhailo Fedorov, Head of the Ministry of Digital Transformation, reported that the drone can hit targets at a range of up to 40 km.
Ukraine has a large number of different drones with ranges of up to 20 km, but at night, it is quite difficult to find a target within a range of 20 km.
[...]
Last August, the defense industry introduced a new Perun loitering munition.
Ukraina utvecklar även egna varianter av Lancet, bland annat drönaren Perun (ej att förväxla med videobloggaren).
Ukrainian Strikes May Have Hindered Lancet Drone Production
Militarnyi skrev:Ukrainian attacks on the facilities of the Russian military-industrial complex may have disrupted the production of Lancet kamikaze drones.
[...]
In the summer of 2023, the Lancet manufacturer showed a production site located in a shopping center where hundreds of drones were being manufactured. Russian propagandists claimed that the company could scale up production 50 times.
However, according to the author of the article, after these statements, the number of Lancet drones deployed on the battlefield dropped. He based his analysis on the Russian thematic forum LostArmor, whose users collected videos of the use of these drones.
Vidare försöker Ukraina bromsa produktionen i Ryssland - medelst sina egna drönare!
As Much As You Ever Wanted To Know About 155m Artillery Shell Production and More
Rob’s Substack skrev:Ultimately, I am left with the impression that the US’ solution to problems that require building things is to avoid it at all costs. Congress is loathe to fund munition supplies that are never used, and defense contractors are loathe to build factories that sit idle (and despite what Hollywood may portray, everyone wants deterrence, not actual conflict). Though Congress and DOD are funding a new facility, 3-4 years will have passed before it produces a shell, which is entirely unhelpful in a present conflict. Instead, the DOD is attempting to plug the Ukraine-sized hole with shells from allied nations including Canada, South Korea, Finland, and Germany—places where it’s still possible to build new things.
I believe in alliances, especially when it is the free people of the world standing against aggression from authoritarians. What troubles me here, though, is that the US is pursuing that option because the domestic defense industrial base, inclusive of DOD and its contractors, is sclerotic. It treats time like it’s free. It does not respond quickly. It does not build or innovate around current problems, because of a combination of disincentives from DOD’s own structure and the pervasive challenges of trying to run a manufacturing business in the US. These are largely own goals. If the DOD would write longer term contracts. If we did not declare essential production facilities to be historic landmarks, strangling expansion. I did not even want to get into why GOCOs exist or the labyrinth of DOD procurement, but it is sufficient to say they both pose challenges to doing anything new or different. My solace is that in a real conflict, all of that red tape would be put to the side and people can get about building things. There will be a multi-year lag between when that crisis happens and how fast the factories can return, and I hope we can weather that storm.
Could an entrepreneur change this equation? Anduril’s success is a testament that with the right application of influence and creativity, new companies can compete effectively against the prime contractors. I am less certain that is a possibility here for a few reasons. The primary concern is getting an ROI in 3-4 years on the capital required to build such a facility. You either need a technological edge that dramatically reduces the capital expense, or you need to be able to blend production with other commercial goods (i.e. dual use). For the former, I do not see a dramatically cheaper option unless there is some arbitrage on cheaper electric arc furnaces and presses. For the latter, 3D printing could be an answer, if the material properties existed. However, metal 3D printing companies are struggling with sales as-is, reflecting a lack of commercial demand for commercial 3D printed metal parts. Therefore, even with the steel needed, I am confident it would be a battle to keep them full the rest of the time. This only gets harder without a technological edge like 3D printing, as it would be a sub-scale, commodity steel mill likely optimized for an application with only one real customer.
Det västerländska samhället tycks lida av skleros. Är det möjligt att bota sjukdomen utan att imitera de auktoritära krafter som bekämpas?
hålla reda på alla ukrainska UAV-konstruktioner