De ukrainska generalernas artkel i Ukrininform är ganska intressant ur flera perspektiv. Nu ska jag bära mig åt som Enceladus-kollektivet brukar, och citera längre textstycken, med kortare egna reflektioner emellan. Först tittar man på den troliga ryska strategin:
Certain operational prospects are visible in the Izyum and Bakhmut areas. Reaching the administrative border of Donetsk region can be seen as a probable end goal of Russia’s efforts. The prospect of advances in the Zaporizhia direction looks even more attractive to the enemy. It would ensure further northward action, allowing to pose a direct threat of capturing the cities of Zaporizhia and Dnipro, which will in turn lead to the Ukrainian side losing control over a large part of the country’s Left Bank (of the Dnipro River - ed.). Revisited plans to gain control of Kyiv and the threat of renewed invasion from the territory of the Republic of Belarus cannot be ruled out either.
But further advances in the South Buh direction from the operational bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnipro River open up the most opportunities. Success in the southern part of Ukraine, provided it is utilized quickly and correctly, could yield a double effect. On the one hand, this would open quite realistic prospects of taking over Mykolaiv and Odesa, and on the other hand – create a threat toward Kryvyi Rih before posing threats to the central and western regions of Ukraine.
Detta stämmer ganska väl med vad jag själv antagit. En operation för att försöka ringa in de ukrainska styrkorna i öster, och dessutom att ockupera hela Svarta Havskusten. De ukrainska generalerna berör självklart inte vilka planer Ukraina har för att motverka detta, alldeles bortsett för vilka strategiska förmågor ryssarna faktiskt har eller inte har kvar.
Det strategiska initiativet ligger nämligen kvar hos ryssarna. I vilken mån de kan behålla det beror givetvis på vilken militär förmåga som kan uppbådas.
However, looking into the situation that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are likely face in 2023, these things don’t look so clear. In fact, for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the situation will be a complex mix of the actual location of the line of contact, the available resources, the pool of combat-ready forces, and, obviously, the strategic initiative that will remain in the enemy’s hands.
Along with this, pursuing the said logic, it is necessary to note reservations about the tentative line of contact from the Ukrainian perspective. Its outlines have an extremely disadvantageous configuration in the already mentioned Izyum and Bakhmut directions. Substantial efforts on the part of the Russians to wedge into Ukraine’s defenses constrain any operational maneuver and require essentially doubling the number of forces in the area to contain the enemy. The situation becomes especially acute amid the lack of firepower assets and insufficient air defenses.
The situation in the South and East looks no better. The threat of enemy advance toward Zaporizhia has already been mentioned. In addition, there is a persistent threat enemy gaining partial success from the direction of Hulyai Pole, which under certain conditions could create a threat of an entire grouping of Ukrainian troops in the east of Ukraine being encircled.
The fact that the enemy has an operational bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnipro River requires additional efforts to prevent its expansion.
Sedan följet ett längre textstycke om Ukrainas operativa och strategiska möjliugheter, det citerar jag inte här, utan det får man läsa själv. Det intressanta i texten ovan är passusen "the situation becomes especially acute amid the lack of firepower assets and insufficient air defenses", någon som jag framhållit åtskilliga gånger.
Sedan beskriver generalerna Rysslands strategiska övertag mär det gäller långräckviddiga vapen:
This is most noticeable in terms of the maximum operating range of the assets of destruction. For the Russian armed forces, it’s up to 2,000 km, taking into account the range of air-based cruise missiles[2], while for Ukraine’s forces it is actually a mere 100 km, which is limited to the range of missiles and the deployment depth for the outdated short-range ballistic missile systems[3]. Thus, from the onset of the large-scale aggression, Russian weapons could hit targets 20 times farther than the Ukrainians. Translated into the language of military practice, it means that the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in the best-case scenario, are able to employ outdated launchers and strike no farther than the depth of the enemy's operational rear. At the same time, the enemy is able to inflict point strikes on targets across the entire depth of the country's territory, doing it with impunity.
It’s precisely this capability that should be considered as the Russian army’s Center of Gravity from a military standpoint. As long as the current situation persists, this war can last for years.
Det här textstycket har Enceladus-kollektivet redan citerat, och det visar vad det är som krävs:
We are talking, of course, about Ukraine's partners supplying the relevant weapon systems or certain types of ammunition with the appropriate range. And it’s so much about some certain models, such as, for example, the MGM-140B ATACMS Block 1A missile for the M142 HIMARS. A comprehensive approach must be applied to re-equipping artillery and missile forces, tactical aviation, Navy, and other components of Ukraine’s military might. The discussion should address creating or developing capabilities, not just the amount of weapons and equipment to be supplied to brigades slated for re-equipment.
I princip en fullständig ombeväpning av Ukrainas försvarsmakt med moderna Nato-vapen. Det är en process som kräver lång tid, eftersom USA/Nato inte har så mycket vapen som krävs i sina arsenaler. Under tiden krävs enorma belopp i ekonomiska bistånd, vid sidan av det militära biståndet, för att hålla den ukrainska statsapparaten igång.
Samtidigt som ryssarna fortsätter att skjuta sönder den ukrainska infrastrukturen.
Dessa generaler (Mykhailo Zabrodskyi har avgått ur aktiv tjänst) är förhållandevis unga (födda 1973). Zabrodskyi påbörjade sin militära karriär under Sovjetunionens sista år och har tydligen bl.a., studerat i fem år vid en militärakademi i S:t Petersburg. Rimligtvis vet han en del om hur ryssarna tänker. Zabrodskyi var fallskärmsjägare till truppslaget.
Generallöjtnant Mykhailo Zabrodskyi (pens.).
Den vinröda baskern är tydligen en genomgående uniformspersedel för fallskärmsjägare världen över.
