dr Cassandra Nojdh skrev: ↑torsdag 01 augusti 2024 20:17
Och så citatförfalskar vi igen! Det som Enceladus-kollektivet klipper bort är väl så intressant:
Det går att läsa hela inlägget genom att klicka på pilen. Signaturen "Sam Greene"
misstänker att fångutbytet beror på en ökad desperation hos Putin:
Sam Greene skrev:If I had to hazard a guess, then, it would be that the Kremlin sees an opportunity to try to isolate Ukraine. By making this exchange, Moscow is seeking to demonstrate that (a) it can negotiate in good faith, and (b) it is willing to do deals with the West.
/6
[...]
There may be a reason the Kremlin is taking that risk. With increased Western aid making it to the front, tremendous losses yielding only minimal territory, plus Trump 2.0 looking less likely, Moscow may see a now-or-never opportunity to cement its gains.
/9
[...]
Lastly, one quick thought about Russian "good will": Releasing political prisoners and hostages is not a sign of good will. These are not enemy combatants or spies, whose capture is legitimate. None of them should ever have been held in a Russian prison in the first place.
/END
Evan, Alsu och 14 andra politiska fångar
kan alltså tacka för
Trumps kräftgång!
Enceladus skrev: ↑onsdag 08 maj 2024 12:55
Demografin är ett av landets bekymmer. Putin försökte lindra problemet genom att anamma massinvandring - en av få saker som han gjorde rätt i - men han skrämde också iväg sina bästa. Vidare fick han betala priset i form av en etnonationalistisk opposition som består än idag. I Europa är dessa Putins vänner...
Why Are Central Asian Migrant Workers Spurning Russia?
Carnegie Politika skrev:Over the past two years, the annual number of migrants entering Russia has remained stable at about 3 million. Most, however, are seasonal workers who do not stay long. Net migration was nearly 500,000 in 2021—the year before the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine—but it fell to 62,000 in 2022 as a result of Western sanctions hitting wages, and the recruitment of migrants into the Russian armed forces.
[...]
Remittances account for up to 40 percent of Tajikistan’s GDP, and more than 20 percent of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan’s. With more and more Central Asians leaving Russia as a result of the pandemic, the invasion, and now the crackdown on migrants, less money is being sent home. In 2023, remittances to Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan fell by 42 percent, 12 percent, and 8 percent, respectively.
[...]
There is also demand for Central Asian labor in the European Union: particularly in Eastern Europe, where many people have left to work in wealthier Western Europe. In Slovakia, 75 percent of companies report a shortage of workers. Little surprise, then, that the Volkswagen plant in Bratislava employed over 1,500 Uzbeks in 2023. Those workers made an average of 1,400 euros a month: far more than they could earn in Russia. Central Asian labor flows to Poland, Czechia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria are also on the rise.
Samtidigt ökar konkurrensen om Centralasiens migranter, med Ryssland som den obestridliga förloraren.
Antalet
visuellt bekräftade ryska förluster uppgår till 17 215 enheter, varav 3 296 stridsvagnar, 121 flygplan, 139 helikoptrar, 15 strids- och 399 spaningsdrönare.