Why Putin’s Interview With Tucker Carlson Didn’t Go to Plandr Cassandra Nojdh skrev: ↑fredag 09 februari 2024 8:33 Det här kommer ju åtminstone de amerikanska fascisterna att slicka i sig.
Tatiana Stanovaya håller inte med. Putin lever i sin egen fantasivärld - livrädd för både virus och förgiftning. Julian Waller kommer fram till liknande slutsatser:Carnegie Politika skrev:The arrival of conservative talk show host Tucker Carlson in Moscow at the beginning of February to interview Russian President Vladimir Putin sparked a media furore. In the West, there was outrage at Carlson giving a platform to the person responsible for unleashing a brutal and devastating war in Ukraine. But in Russia, the visit was met with euphoria, with state-owned media portraying Carlson as one of the most famous and most influential journalists in the United States.
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Strategically speaking, Putin gave up on the West at the end of 2019 when he convinced himself that whoever was in the White House, Washington would still seek to destroy Russia. That meant Moscow increasingly saw dialogue as a waste of time, and caused Russian politics to descend into a civilizational stand-off with the West.
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The spectacle of the two men talking past one another is symptomatic: the war in Ukraine and its terrible consequences have pushed Russia into an ideological deadlock with the West, and convinced the Kremlin that it is engaged in an existential struggle. Given the broader context, even a dialogue between Putin’s Russia and conservative America is an extremely difficult goal to achieve.
Putin och Carlson talade alltså förbi varandra. De hade helt olika mål med intervjun. Däremot stämmer det att Putin kan tala engelska - och till och med sjunga:Julian Waller skrev:Third, I don't think we can understand this interview as some sort of functionalist strategic communication exercise at all. VVP clearly did not care to talk about US political issues, he did not "throw red meat to MAGA" or whatever, he did not rise to the bait several times to get on a cleaner messaging narrative that would sell with an international audience of illiberal or West-skeptical types. At all! It was the above, which means this interview was about what Vladimir Putin himself thought rather than what he thought would sell best. That's incredibly unusual for an interview like this.
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Finally, as I've noted, this interview was pretty strange. Tucker tried to move things in a way that fit his own views (NATO expansion, the 'who runs the US' question, demonic forces on earth (?)), which was pretty cringe. But he actually did a decent job overall (sorry!). He asked about Gershkovich and pushed fairly hard all things considered, he got steamrolled by VVP but managed to barely hold on given the very meandering discussion (Putin's framing of 2004 and 2013-14 is genuinely difficult to understand if you don't already know the events quite well), he didn't crash the interview so bad that it ended early, he figured out he had a unique opportunity to let Putin talk, and in doing so he provided us a unique window into VVP.
It turns out that Putin says the same thing to Tucker as he does to Ru journos, with even more Putinsplaining. Which is illuminating! The history thing is the real deal, as is his belief that negotiations (in Russia's favor and in accordance with Putin's own sense of what is reasonable) are possible. Both of these things are really important for us to get at analytically.
As Election Looms, Putin Is in a Wartime Trap of His Own Making
I denna artikel beskriver Stanovaya hur Putin missförstår sina teknokrater. Vidare har Boris Nadezjdin stoppats från att delta i spektaklet - inte heller enligt plan.Carnegie Politika skrev:Take the battle that unfolded over the scenarios for Putin’s nomination for reelection. The Kremlin’s domestic policy bloc was adamant that the vision for the country’s future should be built upon a civilian agenda, with buzzwords such as “achievements,” “progress,” and “development.” The war, in contrast, is something temporary on the periphery of public life and people’s consciousness. The embodiment of this camp’s idea is the “Russia” exhibition at Moscow’s VDNKh complex showcasing the country’s supposed achievements. Accordingly, the domestic policy bloc curators had primed the president to use it as the setting for his announcement that he would run again.
In the end, however, Putin confirmed that he would run again in a very different setting, and in a mumbled response to a clumsily staged request from a former Donbas military commander. The message—that the country is fighting for its survival, and every Russian must play their part—could not have been more different to that planned. The proponents of this message are betting everything on a long-term political mobilization in which the general public becomes complicit in military decisions.
Austria’s dependence on Russian gas rises to 98%, two years after Ukraine war
Österrike är en kustlös stat - precis som övriga proryska länder i Europa och Afrika. Det är dags för Ukraina och Bulgarien att ta bättre betalt för sina ledningar!EURACTIV skrev:The 98% figure is a massive increase compared to the 17% achieved in October 2022, when Russia itself restricted gas flows to Europe. But the trend was soon reversed and the share of Russian gas was already back at 43% in August last year.
The high share of Russian gas is partly caused by rapidly falling gas consumption in Austria – from 100 TWh down to 75 TWh in 2023, according to figures from the energy ministry.
Another reason is the contractual ties. Austrian utility OMV committed to a “take-or-pay” arrangement with Gazprom for up to 60 TWh a year, nearly enough to meet the country’s entire gas demand. These supplies, contracted in 2018 until 2040, come at a likely cheaper price than neighbouring Germany, which must rely on global markets to secure liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments.
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“Imports via Germany are subject to a gas storage levy of €1.86/MWh. Italy is also planning to levy a charge of €2.19/MWh for gas exports from 1 April 2024,” said Dolna-Gruber.